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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953 as amended) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in appeals
from a court of record in criminal cases.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Trial Court Properly Admitted Hearsay Statements made by the
Deceased Victim. Issues of law are reviewed under a correctness standard, State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions relevant to the
determination of this matter are set forth in the Addendum:
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

STATEMENT OF CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about July 17, 2003, Dycie Allred (hereinafter "Ms. Allred") and witness Eric
Sanders (hereinafter "Mr. Sanders"), attended a movie at a movie theater in the
Sugarhouse area of Salt Lake City. Trial Transcript Page 41 (hereinafter T.T.).
Defendant/Appellant Rocky Williams, (hereinafter "Appellant",) was attending a movie
at the same theater. T.T. 4 3 - 4 5 . In the parking lot outside the theater Appellant
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observed Ms. Allred and Mr. Sanders and started to walk toward them. T.T. 48-49. He
turned back around and did not make contact with them at this time. T.T. 49.
Ms. Allred had a protective order against Appellant which prohibits him from
having any contact with her. Record (hereinafter "R.") 179 and T.T. 77-78. As Mr.
Sanders and Ms. Allred were in their vehicle in the parking lot Appellant passed in front
of them in his vehicle. TT. 50-51. Ms. Allred stated "Oh, my God, there's Rocky." TT.
52 and R. 179. Ms. Alfred's demeanor at seeing Appellant was "very fearful, shaken up."
TT. 51. She was so shaken up that Mr. Sanders was concerned about her ability to drive
and asked her to pull over so they could switch and have him drive. TT. 53-54. As they
were pulled over to switch drivers, Appellant pulled his vehicle in front of theirs with his
vehicle at an angle two feet from the front bumper of the vehicle driven by Ms. Allred.
TT. 54-55. Ms. Allred was upset to the point she was crying and shaking. TT. 55.
Appellant got out of his car and leaned over the roof of his car. TT. 55-56. He
pointed at Ms. Allred. TT. 56. Appellant had a look of rage on his face. TT. 56. He had
his finger out and was repeatedly thrusting it back and forth. TT. 57. He was yelling
something but Mr. Sanders could not hear what he was yelling because the car windows
were rolled up. TT. 56-58. Mr. Sanders felt threatened by the Appellant's actions. TT.
57. Ms. Allred put her vehicle into reverse so she could back away and leave. TT. 58.
Appellant pulled out in his vehicle and headed toward the vehicle Ms. Allred was driving.
TT. 58. Both vehicles were traveling westbound. TT. 58. Ms. Allred turned her vehicle
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to go eastbound, the opposite direction of Appellant. TT. 58. Seconds later Mr. Sanders
observed the Appellant "on our tail." TT. 59. At some time during the period Mr.
Sanders used his cell phone to call 911. TT. 59. Ms. Allred stated to Mr, Sanders that the
Appellant had just threatened to kill her. TT. 61. As Ms. Allred was driving east,
Appellant tried several times to get past Ms. Allred's car to force her to stop. TT. 62.
This occurred on the road exiting the complex where the theater was located until Ms.
Allred reached the main road. TT. 64. Appellant was gesturing and yelling. TT. 65.
Ms. Allred reached an intersection with the main road. TT. 64-66. Ms. Allred
turned south. TT. 66-67. Appellant could have gone straight but turned south as well.
TT. 66-67. Ms. Allred proceeded to turn right, into a parking lot. TT. 67-68. Appellant
turned right and followed, "tailgating" her vehicle. TT. 67-68. Appellant pulled his car in
front of Ms. Allred's three or four times so she was required to stop her vehicle and pull
to the side of the road in order to avoid hitting his vehicle. TT. 69. Mr. Sanders
perceived this conduct of forcing Ms. Allred's car off the road as a threat. TT. 70.
The vehicles reached another intersection where Mr. Allred turned right. T.T. 70-71.
Appellant could have turned left or gone straight but he turned right and continued to
follow Ms. Allred's vehicle. TT. 71. Ms. Allred exited the parking lot back onto a main
road by turning south. TT. 72. Appellant turned right and followed Ms. Allred's vehicle
for a short period of time before making a u-turn and heading north. Ms. Allred entered
onto the freeway. T.T. 74. The 911 operator told them to return to the parking lot where

3

police would meet them. TT. 74. She then exited off the freeway and returned to the
parking lot. TT. 76. Ms. Allred and Mr. Sanders waited approximately 20 - 30 minutes
for police to arrive and then left when they did not make contact with police. T.T. 76,
95.

They returned to Mr. Sanders' sister's house and contacted police from there. T.T.

76. Ms. Allred gave a telephonic statement to Officer Don Ouimette with the Salt Lake
City Police Department (hereinafter "Officer Ouimette.") regarding the incident with
Appellant. T.T. 76-77, 134-147.
Appellant was charged with Violation of a Protective Order, a Class A misdemeanor
in violation of Utah Code Section 75-5-102(3)(a), Threats Against Life or Property, a
Class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Section 75-5-102(3)(a), and Interfering
with a Legal Arrest, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Section 75-5102(3)(a), Record 1-2. (hereinafter "R."). The Appellant moved to sever the charge of
Interfering with a Legal Arrest on April 15, 2005 (R. 109-113) which motion was granted
by Judge Dino Himonas on June 28, 2004 (R. 177). On September 16, 2004, the
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Intefering with a Legal Arrest before
Judge Himonas. (R. 249-50, 234-37).
Prior to any court hearing on this matter, victim Dycie Allred died. T.T. 41. On
January 14, 2004, Appellee filed a "Memorandum Seeking a Ruling of Admissability
Regarding Hearsay Statements Of A Complaining Witness." R. 55-63. On January 14,
2004, Appellant filed a "Motion to Exclude Hearsay Statements of Dycie Allred." R. 64-
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73. On January 16, 2004 the Court held a motion hearing before the Honorable Michael
K. Burton and took evidence regarding the challenged hearsay statements. Eric Sanders
testified at that hearing regarding statements made to him by the deceased witness Dycie
Allred. R. 74. On March 12, 2004, the Honorable Michael K. Burton heard oral
argument on the admissibility of the hearsay statements and took the matter under
advisement. R. 89-90.
Subsequent to the Judge's decision, the United States Supreme Court decision in
Crawford v. Washington was handed down and Appellant filed a motion to reconsider in
light of that decision. R.82-88. Appellee filed a response on March 12, 2004. R. 93-97.
On April 19, 2004 Judge Burton issued a ruling denying Appellant's Motion. R. 107-108.
On June 18, 2004 Appellant filed a Motion to Renew Defendant's Motions to
Suppress Hearsay Statements of Dycie Allred on the basis that Judge Himonas would be
the judge presiding over the trial and Judge Burton had previously heard and denied
Appellant's motion. R. 120-122. On June 18, 2004 Judge Deno Himonas issued a ruling
granting in part and denying in part Appellant's motion. R. 177-78, 190-94. Judge
Himonas ruled that three hearsay statements of deceased victim Dycie Allred were
admissible as present sense impressions and as excited utterances if proper foundation
was laid for their admission at trial. R. 190-94.
The matter came before the Court for a jury trial on July 9, 2004. T.T. 3. The Jury
heard a portion of the 911 tape containing a statement regarding Appellant threatening to
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kill her. T.T. 77 and R. 179. The portion of the 911 tape containing those statements was
entered into evidence without objection from Appellant. T.T. 77 and R. 179.

Appellant

entered into evidence over the objection of the prosecution a copy of the police report
which contained statements made by Ms. Allred to Officer Ouimette. TT. 99-117 (see
especially T.T. 107).
At the conclusion of the trial the Jury returned a verdict of guilty on both remaining
counts. (R. 232). Appellant was sentenced based on his conviction on all three charges on
October 1, 2004. R. 260-62. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 26, 2004. R.
264.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted hearsay statements made by the deceased victim.
The statements were not testimonial in nature and therefore were not barred by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The
statements were properly admitted under two long established exceptions to the hearsay
rule. First, the statements were properly admitted as excited utterances under Rule 803(2)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The statements were made spontaneously while the event
was occurring and while the declarant, Dycie Allred, was still under the influence of the
event. Second, the statements were properly admitted as present sense impressions under
Rule 803(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The statements were made by Dycie Allred
as the event occurred and were descriptive of the event.
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The admission of Officer Ouimettes's report containing additional hearsay
statements of the victim Dycie Allred was not in error where Appellant moved for its
admission. Under the invited error doctrine, "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1120 (Utah 1993).
Appellant has failed to show as required that there is a reasonable likelihood of a
result more favorable to the Defendant if the hearsay statements had been excluded.
"... Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting the challenged evidence, "we will only
reverse if this error was harmful, 'i.e., if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood
of an outcome more favorable to the defendant.'" State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (in
turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993)). Given the totality of the
evidence presented, there exists no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been
more favorable to the Defendant absent the introduction into evidence of the challenged
statements.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED HEARSAY STATEMENTS
OF THE DECEASED VICTIM DYCIE ALLRED.
A.

The trial court properly held that the admission of Dycie Allred's
statements were not barred by Crawford v. Washington as they were
not testimonial in nature.
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Appellant's reliance on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) is without
merit. Crawford holds that whenever the prosecution offers hearsay evidence against the
accused that is testimonial in nature, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause requires
a showing of both unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 68.
The Supreme Court in Crawford did not define what constitutes testimonial statements,
but offered three possible formulations without endorsing any. The first, suggested by the
defendant in his brief, would limit testimonial statements to "ex parte in-court testimony
or its functional equivalent." Id. at 51. This definition encompasses "affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."
Id. The second suggested definition of "testimonial" was taken from the Court's prior
decision in White v. Illinois , 502 U.S. 346 (1992), and includes "extrajudicial statements .
. . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004), citing
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). The third definition was suggested by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and included "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial." Id. at 52.
These definitions differ substantially in scope. The third, which is based on a
reasonable, objective person's recognition that the statement would be available for later
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trial use, is the most abstract and has the broadest reach. The second, the White
definition, is the narrowest and most concrete, as it is limited to formalized testimonial
materials only. The first suggested definition bridges some of the gaps between the two,
using formal testimony as its touchstone, but expands the category by including "its
functional equivalent" where the declarant would reasonably expect his statement to be
used for prosecution. Id. at 51.
The Court in Crawford implies that the level of government action in eliciting a
statement is highly relevant to its classification as testimonial. "An accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not." Id. at 51.
The actual statement at issue in Crawford was clearly testimonial because it was
obtained during interrogation by the police. The statements challenged by Appellant in
the present case are clearly not testimonial under any of the three tests suggested by the
Court in the Crawford opinion. The statements made by Ms. Allred and admitted at trial
against Appellant were statements made to her fiance, Eric Sanders. The statement "Oh,
my God, there's Rocky" was made to Mr. Sanders upon Ms. Allred first observing the
Appellant. The statement that she had heard Appellant threaten to kill her was made to
Mr. Sanders while he was on the phone with 911 and was recorded on the 911 recording.
Neither statement was made in response to any police questioning. In fact, neither

statement was even made in response to questions from the 911 dispatcher. The
statements made by Ms. Allred to Mr. Sanders were clearly not testimonial in nature.
While this is an issue of first impression in Utah, other states have addressed what
constitutes testimonial statements post Crawford. In People v. Kilday, 123 Cal. App. 4th
406 (2004); rev. granted, 105 P.3d 114 (2005), the California Court of Appeals analyzed
"testimonial" in terms of whether the police were "interrogating." (It should be noted that
this case is not citable in California pursuant to their rules of procedure as a review has
been granted by a higher court). In Kilday, the Court found that the victim's first
statement to officers responding to the scene was not testimonial. Because the police
were dealing with "a frightened and upset [victim], the area was unsecure and the
situation was uncertain." Id. at 421. Thus, the victim's detailed account to the police
about how she was beaten, cut and thrown into the street was not testimonial. Id. at 420.
However, the second statement of the victim, taken later at the scene by a female officer
summoned specifically to talk to the victim, was taken in an "investigative capacity to
produce evidence" and was found to be taken in response to interrogation. Id.
In People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 773 (2004), the defendant's wife called
911 to report that her husband hit her. The California Court of Appeals likewise found
this statement to be non-testimonial because it was not "knowingly given in response to
structured police questioning." Id. at 776. As the court noted in Corella, "Not only is a
victim making a 911 call in need of assistance, the 911 operator is determining the
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appropriate response, not conducting a police interrogation in contemplation of a future
prosecution." Id.
In People v. Caudillo, the California Court of Appeals came to a similar
conclusion. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574; rev. granted 2005 Cal. LEXIS 114 (Jan. 12, 2005). (It
should be noted that this case is not citable in California pursuant to their rules of
procedure as a review has been granted by a higher court). In this case, a third party nonvictim called 911 to report "men with guns" at a 7-Eleven. Id. at 576. This anonymous
caller provided a license plate number and description of the car from which the gunshots
were fired, as well as a description of the car fired upon. Even though the 911 call was
made for the specific purpose of providing the police with the information necessary to
apprehend the shooters, the court found that the call did not come within the ucore class
of 'testimonial' statements" which is the focus of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 590.
The court further held that the call was not "made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial." Id. " . . . statements made without reflection or deliberation are not made in
contemplation of their "testimonial" use in a future trial." Id.
In People v. Moscat, 111 N.Y.S.2d 875 (2004), a New York court determined that
911 calls were generally nontestimonial. The trial court reasoned that unlike testimonial
police interrogation, which "is undertaken by the government in contemplation of
pursuing criminal charges against a particular person," a 911 call is initiated by a citizen
11

calling for the aid of the government. Id. at 879. The court stated: "A testimonial
statement is produced when the government summons a citizen to be a witness; in a 911
call, it is the citizen who summons the government to her aid." Id.
In the present case the statements made by Dycie Allred were not even made to the
911 operator, but were made to her fiancee Eric Sanders. The fact that Mr. Sanders was
on the phone with 911 when one of the statements was made and that that statement was
recorded on the 911 call does not make it testimonial. As noted in Corella and Moscat
supra, even if the statements had been made to the 911 operator those statements would
still not be testimonial in nature. The call to 911 was to summon emergency aid and was
not "knowingly given in response to structured police questioning." Corella at 776. The
statements were "made without reflection or deliberation and [were] not made in
contemplation of their "testimonial" use in a future trial. Moscat at 776.
Because the hearsay statements of Dycie Allred admitted against Appellant at his
trial were not testimonial in nature, their admission was not barred by the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington. The Trial Court properly admitted the
statements.
B.

The trial court properly admitted the two statements of deceased victim
Dycie Allred as excited utterances pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence
803(2).

The trial court properly determined that the statements by Ms. Allred (1) "Oh, my
God, there's Rocky" and (2) that Appellant had just threatened to kill her were excited
12

utterances made while Ms. Allred was still under the stress of the event and were
therefore admissable pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 803(2). Utah Rule of Evidence
803(2) ["Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial."] reads: "The
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness: * * * * (2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of the excitement caused by the
event or condition. * * * *"
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington restricts the
admission of hearsay evidence that is testimonial in nature. However in Crawford the
Court specifically held that statements that were non-testimonial in nature can still be
admitted under existing well established exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 68. The test
for determining whether a statement meets such an exception is the test developed by the
Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Id. Where non-testimonial hearsay is
concerned, States are offered flexibility to develop hearsay law, which will continue to be
evaluated under Roberts. Id. at 68. The two-prong test articulated in Roberts allows the
statement of an unavailable witness to be admitted only if it bears adequate indicia of
reliability, meaning that it either falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bears
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Roberts at 66.
This Court addressed the admissibility of excited utterances in West Valley City v.
Hutto, 5 P.3d 1 (Utah App. 2000). The excited utterance must meet three essential

13

elements: (i) the statement was in reaction to a truly startling event, (ii) the statement was
made while under the stress of excitement caused by that event, and (iii) the statement
relates to the event. Id. 4-5. Dycie made the statements while her car was being followed
by Appellant against whom she had a protective order and while he was attempting to
force her vehicle to pull over. This is a startling event. The statements were made while
the events were still occurring and Ms. Allred was still under the stress of the event.
Witness Sanders testified that she was pale, shaking, upset and crying during the incident.
The statements that were admitted, "Oh, my God, there's Rocky" and that Appellant had
just threatened to kill her, directly related to the event that was occurring.
Dycie's statements were spontaneous outbursts made while under the stress of a
startling event and directly related to that event. Those statements were therefore
properly admitted as excited utterances pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 803(2).
C.

The trial court properly admitted the two statements of deceased
victim Dycie AHred as Present Sense Impressions pursuant to Utah
Rule of Evidence 803(1)

Because Ms. Alfred's statements were not testimonial in nature, the trial court
properly admitted them as Present Sense Impressions. Utah Rule of Evidence 803(1)
["Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial."] reads: "The following are
not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1)
Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition
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made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately
thereafter."
The Utah Supreme Court cited this rule in State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700
(Utah 1995). In that case, the court admitted into evidence as hearsay a video tape made
by a police officer as he went through the defendant's home. Id. The Utah Supreme
Court included the officer's narrative as he made the tape as evidence because he made it
while perceiving the event. Id.
Dycie Allred's statements made to Mr. Sanders and recorded on his call to 911
were statements "describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter." Utah Rule of Evidence
803(1). These statements were therefore properly admitted as present sense impressions
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 803(1).
II.

THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS MADE BY DYCIE
ALLRED AND CONTAINED IN THE POLICE REPORT OF OFFICER
OUIMETTE IS NOT ERROR WHERE APPELLANT MOVED FOR THE
ADMISSION OF THOSE STATEMENTS AND INVITED THE ERROR.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage

of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1120 (Utah 1993). The "invited error'1 doctrine,
has two principal purposes. First, it allows the trial court the first opportunity to address a
claim of error. Id. "Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. See also, State v.
15

Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987) and State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). In both State v. Hamilton, 70 P.3d 111 (Utah 2003) and State v.
Pinder, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, (Utah 2005) the Utah Supreme Court has refused to
consider the insufficiency of a jury instruction when the jury instruction was stipulated to
by the Appellant, citing the invited error doctrine.
In the present case the evidence challenged by Appellant, the hearsay statements of
Dycie Allred contained in the police report of Officer Ouimette, was evidence that he
moved to admit at trial. Under the invited error doctrine, Appellant is barred from
claiming any error based on it admission into evidence.

III.

THERE IS NOT A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE VERDICT
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF THE CHALLENGED
STATEMENTS HAD BEEN EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE.
Given the totality of the evidence presented, there exists no reasonable likelihood

that the verdict would have been favorable to the Defendant absent the introduction into
evidence of the challenged statements. The cumulative evidence in this case was
sufficient such that the admission of the hearsay statements is unlikely to have affected
the outcome of the verdict. See First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996). "'[E]ven if we were to conclude that the evidence here was improperly
admitted, that would not decide the issue. We still would have to determine whether the
error was harmful."' Id., quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). In

16

the present case, the cumulative evidence against the Appellant was such that the jury
would have rendered the same decision even if the hearsay statements had been excluded.
We will not overturn the trial court's decision regarding admissibility of evidence
unless it was an abuse of discretion. ... Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting
the challenged evidence, "we will only reverse if this error was harmful, 'i.e., if absent
the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the
defendant."'
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White, 880
P.2d 18, 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (in turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221
(Utah 1993)).
Considering the weight of evidence presented at trial, there is no "reasonable
likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant" in the present matter.
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699. The parties stipulated that Appellant was subject to a
protective order which prohibited him from having any contact with Ms. Allred. Mr.
Sanders testified he personally observed the Defendant follow the vehicle he was in
driven by the victim Ms. Allred. He described a driving pattern when Appellant had
multiple opportunities to go a different direction than the victim's vehicle, but continued
to follow her vehicle at each turn. He described a driving pattern in which the Appellant
moved his vehicle in front of the victim's vehicle and attempted to force it to stop. He
testified that at one point, Appellant got out of his car leaned over it and was gesturing
angrily in the direction of the victim's car and that Appellant appeared to be in a rage.
Ms. Allred was crying and shaking. Appellant yelled something at them but Mr. Sanders
could not hear what he yelled. Mr. Sanders felt threatened by Appellant's action. He
17

testified that Ms. Allred was "very fearful and shaken up" to the point where had wanted
her to pull over because he felt she was too upset to drive. Three or four times Appellant
tried to force the victim vehicle over to the curb. Mr. Sanders felt threatened by
Appellant attempting to force their vehicle over. This evidence was sufficient for the jury
to convict the Defendant of the two charges. Given the weight of this evidence, there is
no reasonable likelihood the jury would have returned a different verdict absent the
introduction of the hearsay statements.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of the
trial court.
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Rule 802

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

ness' prior consistent statement — modern
state criminal cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014.
Admissibility of tape recording or transcript
of "911" emergency telephone call, 3 A.L.R.5th
784.
Admissibility in evidence of composite picture or sketch produced by police to identify
offender, 23 A.L.R.5th 672.
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Admissibility as "not hearsay" of statement
by party's attorney under Federal Rules of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or 801(d)(2)(D), 117
A.L.R. Fed. 599.
Interpreter or translator as party's agent for
purposes of "admission by party-opponent" exception to hearsay rule (Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(D)), 121 A.L.R. Fed. 611.

Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
Advisory C o m m i t t e e N o t e . — This rule is
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(1974), and is the same as the first paragraph of
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Cross-References. —Affidavits, taking and
certification of, § 78-26-5 et seq.
Contemporaneous entries and writings of decedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8.

Judgment, entry of, U.R.C.P. 58A.
Judgment roll in criminal case, contents and
filing, U.R. Crim. P. 22.
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12.
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3U.R.C.R 44.
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
In general.
Chemical breath analysis.
Nonhearsay.
Purpose.

Bennett, 741 R2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).

In general.
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two
basic reasons: (1) the person who purports to
know the facts is not stating them under oath;
(2) that person is not present for cross-examination. State v. Sibert, 6 U t a h 2d 198, 310 P.2d
388 (1957).
Chemical b r e a t h analysis.
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the admission of
chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory
exception to the hearsay rule. Layton City v.

Nonhearsay.
Police officer's recounting of victim's report of
the crime was not hearsay because it was not
presented for the t r u t h of the matter, but to
explain why the officer took the investigative
steps t h a t he did. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Purpose.
The hearsay rule h a s as its declared purpose
the exclusion of evidence not subject to crossexamination concerning the truthfulness of the
matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law Review. — The Unconstitutionality of Statutes of Limitation on Habeus Corpus Relief and the Need for Reliability Findings
for Child Victims' Out-of-Court Statements,
1998 Utah L. Rev. 619.
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y Law. — Com-

ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and application of child hearsay statutes, 71 A.L.R.5th 637.

Rule 803, Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant
immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression, A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
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health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness'
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum
or record'may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification t h a t
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term '"business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda,
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel,
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a
public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record,
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data
compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office
or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902,
or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages,
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
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(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings,
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or
the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record
of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of
documents of t h a t kind in t h a t office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document,
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been
inconsistent with the t r u t h of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements m a y b e read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other t h a n impeachment, judgments against persons other than the
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect
admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
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trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2001.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e N o t e . — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule
63(4)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v.
McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978).
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule
63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (5) h a d no express counterpart in
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), although Rule
63(4)(c) embodied some of the substance but
applied only where the declarant was unavailable. Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
have recognized such an exception. Sagers v.
International Smelting Co., 50 U t a h 423, 168
Pac. 105 (1917). The Utah courts have sanctioned the admission of the record of the past
recollection, contra to this rule. Sagers v. International Smelting Co., supra.
Subdivision (6) is comparable to Rule 63(13),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Former Rule
63(13) has been given broad application.
Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah
1976); State v. Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah
1977); International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). The
rule allows computerized records and data to be
admitted. See Barney v. Cox, 588 R2d 696
(Utah 1978).
Subdivision (7) is similar to Rule 63(14),
U t a h Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (8) is similar to Rules 63(15) and
(16), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah
Code Annotated, Sections 78-25-3 and 78-25-4
(1953). Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah
1978).
Subdivision (8)(C) is substantially the same
as Rules 63(15), (16) and (17), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971). See also, Price v. Turner, 28
U t a h 2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972); Bridges v.
Union Pacific R.R., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d
738 (1971).
Subdivision (9) is similar to Rule 63(18),
U t a h Rules of Evidence (1971), as related to the
admission of evidence of certificates of marriage and Rules 63(24) and (25), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), covering vital statistics in
certain instances. See also In re Lewis, 121
U t a h 385, 242 R 2 d 565 (1952).
Subdivision (10) is comparable to Rule
63(17)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivisions (11), (12) and (13) are compara-

ble to Rules 63(23) through (26), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), and In re Lewis, supra.
Subdivisions (14) and (15) are comparable to
Rules 63(19), (22) and (29), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (16) is comparable to Rules
63(19) and 67, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
and Olsen v. Swapp, 535 P2d 1233 (Utah 1975).
Subdivision (17) is comparable to Rule
63(30), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (18) is comparable to Rule
63(31), Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953),
which was not adopted in Utah. However, Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-25-6 (1953) provides for the admissibility of historical works,
books of science or art, published maps or
charts. See also Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah
129, 69 P. 660 (1902). In Jenkins v. Parrish, 627
P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), the court held an expert
could be cross-examined from a learned treatise
which the expert has recognized as authoritative, or that the expert has relied on, or that is
established as authoritative by another expert.
Such evidence would now be admissible on the
substance of the case.
Subdivision (19) is comparable to Rule
63(26), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (20) is comparable to Rule
63(27), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (21) is comparable to Rule
63(28), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (22) is comparable to Rule
63(20), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (23) is comparable to Rule
63(24), (26) and (27), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (24) h a s no counterpart in Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971).
This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The
2001 amendment adopts changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective December
1, 2000.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2001 amendment inserted the language beginning "or by
certification" and ending "permitting certification" in Subdivision (6).
Cross-References. — Affidavits admissible
in hearing on motion, Rule 43(b), U.R.C.P.
Affidavits, taking and certification of, § 7826-5 et seq.
Contemporaneous entries and writings of decedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8.
Historical works, books of science and art,
and published maps and charts as evidence,
§ 78-25-6.

